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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-Adoption of Uniform
Commercial Code as the Applicable Federal Law
in an Action for Breach of Government
Contract-United States v.
W egematic Corp.*
Appellant contracted to supply the Federal Reserve Board with a
"truly revolutionary" electronic digital computing system. After
twice requesting postponement of the delivery date, appellant informed the Board that delivery under the terms of the contract would
be impracticable because of unforeseen engineering difficulties that
would require at least one year and one million dollars to overcome.
Appellant asked for cancellation of the contract, but the Board refused and brought a suit for damages. Both parties conceded that
federal law governed the action; appellant, however, argued that section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) should be
adopted as the controlling federal law of sales. This section excuses a
default on a contract when the failure of presupposed conditions
makes performance impossible. 1 The federal district court rendered
judgment for the United States. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the
court adopted section 2-615 of the Code as the controlling federal law,
but held, affirmed. Section 2-615 of the Code does not relieve appellant from a default when appellant has promoted its product as a
revolutionary breakthrough, expressly agreed to liquidated damages
in case of late performance, authorized the Board to resort to other
manufacturers in the event of non-delivery, and has not presented
sufficient evidence of the failure of presupposed conditions.
The court's adoption of the Code as the controlling law represents an attempt to make the law applicable to federal contracts
compatible with current commercial practice. The number of federal
government contracts has been steadily growing as a result of both
the constant expansion in the scope of government activities and the
express federal policy favoring the dispersal of government contracts
• 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615 and comment [hereinafter cited as
U.C.C.].
1. See
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among small businesses.2 Thus, two questions have become increasingly significant: (I) whether to construe these contracts according to
federal or state law; (2) if federal law is to be applicable, what sources
should the courts draw on to determine the substance of that law.
It is clear that federal law applies where there is both a federal
statute or regulation governing the activity at issue3 and a congressional intent that this statute or regulation should be construed
under a uniform federal rule.4 Unfortunately, Congress has not
manifested any such intent with respect to the construction of government contracts. Nevertheless, federal courts have generally come to
hold that federal law is applicable in federal government contract
cases. 5
The problem of choice of law in government contract cases is an
outgrowth of the Erie 6 decision in which the Supreme Court cast
doubt on the power of the federal courts to declare the federal law as
governing, even when a valid federal program is involved.7 The
effect of Erie on federal contract cases was unclear: in the five years
following the decision, the federal courts could not agree as to
whether state or federal law controlled. The question was somewhat
clarified when the Supreme Court ruled on a related issue in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States. 8 In that case the court held that the
government's rights and duties on the commercial paper it issues are
to be measured by federal law. The sweeping language of this opinion
led to a resurgence in the application of federal law in cases involving
established federal functions, including government contract cases. 9
2. E.g., 64 Stat. 815 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 215l(d) (1964). See also Pfocher,
The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 LA.
L. REV. 37 (1951).
3. E.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961) (regulation); Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) (statutes).
4. E.g., Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); United States v. Lambeth, 176 F.2d (9th
Cir. 1949). Although these two rules may appear to be similar, there have been instances
in which the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress intended state law to be
applicable despite the existence of a federal statute regulating the activity concerned.
E.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, modified, 317 U.S. 602 (1942).
5. See note 16 infra.
6. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Mr. Justice Brandeis declared in a
now famous dictum: "There is no general federal common law."
For discussions that include the topic of the law to be applied in federal government
contracts cases, see Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New England Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 797 [hereinafter cited as Mishkin); Reifenberg, Common Law-Federal,
30 ORE. L. REv. 164 (1951); 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946). Contrary to Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Erie, these authors have concluded that there is in fact a substantial body of federal common law.
7. See Mishkin 799-801.
8. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (1963); Mishkin 828-32.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Pack v. United
States, 176 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1949). See also American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone
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Since Clearfield, the federal courts have generally applied federal
law in government contract cases.10 This tendency to prefer federal
over state law can probably be explained by three factors: (1) the
substantial body of federal legislation pertaining to the negotiation
of government contracts; (2) the fact that these contracts are frequently incident to interstate transactions; (3) the high likelihood
that the litigation would be in the federal courts, regardless of the
law applied.11
The statement that federal law applies in federal government
contract cases must, however, be qualified. Uncertainty has arisen
as a result of cases that have failed to indicate whether they have used
federal or state law to reach a result that is possible under both.12
Further doubt is raised by cases in which the court chose state law
but did not decide whether it was applying state law in its own right
or adopting it as the federal rule. 13 In addition, there are certain
types of cases, involving some federal interest, in which the federal
courts continue to apply state law: when Congress is found to have
intended that state law should apply; 14 when federal statutes incorporate concepts that have always been determined by local law; 15
and when the transactions in question are essentially local in nature
and there is no overriding federal interest dictating the use of federal
law. 16 Moreover, it has been suggested that state law might apply
when the Government places itself in such a position that its rights
must be ascertained by reference to local law; as when the government purchases real estate from one whose title may be invalid under
local law.17 Finally, when there is no need for uniformity, state law
Tire&: Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961); Dumbauld, The Clear Field of Clearfield, 61 DICK. L. REv. 299 (1957); Friendly, supra note 6, at 409; Mishkin 801; Pfocher,
supra note 2, at 44; Reifenberg, supra note 7, at 165-66; 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953).
10. E.g., Priebe &: Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); National Metropolitan
Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Dyke v. Dyke, 227 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850 (1956); Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. United States, 172 F.
Supp. 268 (Ct. Cl. 1959). See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (1963); Pfocher, supra
note 2, at 37, 54-55. However, one commentator has noted the dangers inherent in a
blanket application of federal law to all government contracts and the necessity for
variations in special contexts. See Mishkin 820.
11. Ibid.
12. E.g., S.R.A. Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946).
13. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); 65 MICH. L. REv. 359 (1966).
14. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946); United States
v. Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962) (what constitutes real property for
purposes of federal condemnation).
15. E.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (meaning of "children''); Poff v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 327 U.S. 399 (1946) (meaning of "next of kin" under the FELA).
16. Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
17. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947) (clictum) ("as
when it purchases real estate from one whose title is invalid by that law in relation
to another's claim'). But see United States v. State Box Co., 219 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal.
1963).
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will control an action on a government contract which has been
adapted to the specific law of the state concerned.18
Even where the courts purport to apply a federal rule, the sources
from which this federal rule is determined have remained varied. 19
One possible source, which was suggested in Clearfield, is the commercial law that was developed by the federal court sJecisions in the
century prior to Erie. 20 The courts also have often turned to state
law21 and to the general principles of contract law, as sources for
determining federal law. 22 The principal case is in accord with a
separate line of decisions that have found federal law in certain uniform laws that have been generally accepted by the states, such as the
Uniform Sales Act, 23 the Negotiable Instruments Law,24 and the
Warehouse Receipts Act. 25
It has been argued that a federal law of contracts should be enacted in order to end the disparities, confusions, and conflicts that
arise under present law, and thus prevent the rights of the United
18. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); cf. United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d
577 (8th Cir. 1956). Contra, United States v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1956),
rerld on other grounds, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957).
19. See Mishkin 797. In a given case a federal court might formulate a substantive
rule of its own or elect to draw from an established body of state law. Basically, this
process of election involves a balancing of the need for a uniform federal rule against
the desirability of absorbing local law. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTS § 59 (1963);
Mishkin 811-13 &: 814-32. ·where there have been compelling reasons to ignore state
law and to follow an independent federal rule, courts have done so either because
of a clear congressional policy, e.g., Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940), or lack
of a significant advantage to be served by adopting state law, e.g., Dyke v. Dyke, 227
F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850 (1956).
20. Mr. Justice Douglas noted that although the federal law merchant, which
developed as part of the federal common law in the century following Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Peters) I (1842), represented general commercial law rather than a strictly
federal rule designed to protect federal rights, it stood as a convenient source from
which to fashion federal rules for federal question cases. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
21. E.g., Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust &:: Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956);
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 u.s 570 (1956); see WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (1963);
Mishkin 820-28.
22. E.g., Priebe &:: Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v.
Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Southwest Eng'r Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d
998 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965); United States v. Le Roy Dyal Co., 186
F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).
23. E.g., United States v. Hamden Co-op. Creamery, 297 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1961);
Whitin Mach. Works v. United States, 175 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1949); United States v.
United States Foreign Corp., 151 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Reeve Soundcraft Corp.,
2 CCH Gov'T CONT. REP. H 17,600.572 &: 17,605.30 (1964).
24. New York, N.H. &:: H.R.R. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1950).
25. Terminal Warehouse v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 937 (D.N.J. 1952). However,
in a subsequent Second Circuit case, Judge Friendly rejected a proposed application of
the same act because it would not have expressly resolved the issue before the court.
Yet state law was adopted, and since both states involved had previously enacted the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the act was still given effect. See Cargill Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1960).
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States from being subject to inconsistent26 or possibly unsympathetic
treatment in different jurisdictions.27 This goal of uniformity is
presently unattainable in view of the many alternative sources from
which a federal court may choose a rule of decision. 28 Indeed, it has
even been suggested that the federal courts have regressed to the
very state of uncertainty that Erie was intended to eliminate, by
engaging in the process of deciding whether to formulate their own
rules or to refer to state law. 29 In the principal case, the selection of
the Code as the federal law of sales demonstrates an awareness of this
problem and provides an avenue for its resolution. The adoption
of a uniform act as the federal law seems to promote certainty and
uniformity in actions involving government contracts.30 The fundamental rationale underlying Judge Friendly's majority opinion was
that if the court failed to adopt the Code, the progress that the states
have made in the direction of a uniform commercial law would have
been undermined.31 Thus, the principal case demonstrates the feasibility of implementing a truly uniform law of government contracts
through adoption of the Code by the federal judiciary. All federal
government contracts would be governed by the same set of rules,
and these rules would be compatible with those already in effect in
most states. Moreover, private contractors would not have to accustom themselves to a different set of standards when dealing with
the federal government.32
The infrequent recourse to uniform laws in the past, however,
raises serious doubts as to whether the federal courts will regularly
apply the Code,33 and seems to indicate that the only viable answer
is a Congressional act making the Code applicable to all federal
26. See United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Byron Jackson Co.
v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
27. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS Appendix A (April 1966 Draft); Mishkin 820.
28. See United States v. K.ramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.
1957). The courts split as to whether federal or state law controlled in an action against
a commission merchant for selling livestock subject to a chattel mortgage which secured
a loan from the Farmers Home Administration. A potential source of conflict was
created even though these courts found the merchant not liable, since the more widespread state rule would result in liability. Thus, if the Kramel court, which chose to
apply state law, had been in another state and applying state law, the result would
bave been different. See 105 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1956).
29. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 411.
30. See New York, N.H. &: H.R.R. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 180 F.2d 241, 244
(2d Cir. 1950). After noting that the NIL had been enacted in every state and the District of Columbia, Judge Hand asserted that it was a source of federal law "more complete and more certain, than any other ••••" This passage is cited by Judge Friendly
in the principal case at 676.
31. Principal case at 676.
32. See Mishkin 828, 830.
33. See Mishkin 827; cf. Mount Vernon Co-op. Bank v. Gleason, 367 F.2d 289 (1st
Cir. 1966),
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transactions. The chief merit of this proposal is, of course, the
greater uniformity in commercial law that would result. Furthermore, by adopting the Code as the law applicable to federal transactions, Congress would set an example which might encourage other
nations to enact a similar code and thereby assist in the removal of
international conflicts in commercial law.34 By limiting its adoption
of the Code to cases involving federal government transactions,
Congress also would escape the difficulties that might attach if it
adopted the Code as applicable to all transactions in interstate
commerce.35 There would be no unconstitutional invasion of an
area of law normally reserved to the states.36 Moreover, since most
of this type of litigation is already in the federal courts, either
through federal question jurisdiction or because the United States
is a party, there would be no overburdening of federal court
dockets.37 A more troublesome obstacle, however, results from the
fact that the Code is inconsistent with some existing federal regulations38 and statutes.39 Enactment of the Code would repeal prior
conflicting legislation, 40 but if Congress desired to retain such regulations and statutes, it could certainly harmonize them with the Code
before its adoption.
Nevertheless, in the absence of Congressional adoption of the
UCC for transactions involving the federal government, the principal case indicates that the federal courts have a way to perform the
task of achieving uniformity.
34. See Dean, Conflict of Laws Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Case for
Federal Enactment, 6 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1953). The author reports that Japan is considering adoption of the UCC.
35. For arguments favoring a federal enactment of the UCC making it applicable to
all interstate transactions, see Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PRoB. 100 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Braucher, Federal
Enactment]; Braucher, The Progress of the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 AM. J. COMP.
L. 293, 300-01 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Braucher, The Progress]; Dean, supra note 34,
at 479.
Although unclear for interstate transactions, Congress could clearly enact the UCC
as federal commercial law. See Braucher, Federal Enactment 102; .Braucher, The Progress 301 (1962); Dean, supra note 34, at 482; Friendly, supra note 6, at 419-20; Comment,
45 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1947). The comment makes the interesting suggestion that the
Code be adopted pursuant to the treaty making power of the federal government.
36. See Braucher, Federal Enactment 102; Friendly, supra note 6, at 428.
37. See Braucher, Federal Enactment 111-12; Friendly, supra note 6, at 428 . .Braucher
does not believe that adoption of the Code for interstate transactions would result in a
significant burden on the federal courts, but for persuasive discussions to the contrary,
see FRANKFURTER &: LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 3, 60 &: 102-07 (1928);
Mishkin 813.
38. Mount Vernon Co-op. Bank v. Gleason, 367 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1966).
39. Representative of such statutes are the National .Bank Act and the .Bankruptcy
Act. Although some effort has been made to reconcile federal legislation with the policies embodied in the Code (as in some amendments to the Warehouse Act), such reconciliation has been on a very limited scale. See Braucher, The Progress 293, 301 (1962).
40. U.C.C. § 10-103 repeals statutes, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the Code.

